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SERVICE-CONNECTION AND DRUG-RELATED
OFFENSES: THE MILITARY COURTS' EVEREXPANDING JURISDICTION*

The military community in the United States now consists of
over two million volunteers.1 If any of these servicemembers are
accused of a crime, their only judicial recourse may be to courtsmartial: a system of military courts created under Congress's
Article I powers, independent of - and with limited review by Article III courts.2 This judicial system denies its defendants basic
constitutional rights3 - rights otherwise guaranteed by the Constitution these men and women have sworn to defend, if necessary, with their lives.4
The Supreme Court has acknowledged both the constitutional
basis and the need for a separate military judicial system.5 N onetheless, to minimize the military's encroachment on individual liberties, the Court restricts military courts' jurisdiction to "'the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed'''6 by allowing
military courts jurisdiction only over military personneF who allegedly commit "service-connected" crimes.8 By devising the
service-connection requirement in O'Callahan 'D. Parker,9 the
Court provided eligible servicemembers the right to a trial in a
civilian court, free from the shortcomings of the military courts.
To clarify the O'Callahan decision, the Court, in Relford 'D. Commandant,10 refined the service-connection test by specifying criteria probative of service connection, requiring courts, by reference
to the enumerated criteria, to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether a given offense is service connected.11
In the years since O'Callahan and Relford, military courts have
* This Note was developed by Michael Caudell-Feagan and Daniel Warshawsky.
1. U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE/84 ALMANAC, Sept. 1984, at 24.
2. See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
4. See 10 U.S.C. § 502 (1982) (enlistment oath).
5. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1952).
6. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (emphasis in original) (quoting
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955)).
7. Id. at 267 (indicating that precedent dictates courts-martial have no jurisdiction over persons who are not members of the military).
8. Id. at 272.
9. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
10. 401 U.S. 355 (1971). The Court recognized that the O'Callahan decision had
engendered confusion in the military courts. See id. at 370.
11. See id. at 365-69. For the Court's list of probative criteria see infra note 84.
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at times only reluctantly adhered to the Supreme Court's strict
service-connection analysis, particularly for defendants charged
with drug-related offenses.12 Nevertheless, until recently, military courts set aside their reluctance and diligently applied the
service-connection criteria whenever defendants challenged the
courts' jurisdiction.13 Yet, military courts are now discarding the
ad hoc approach and are returning to a virtual per se test that
finds all drug offenses service connected.14 Instead of judging
each case against the Relford Court's criteria, military courts justify their assertions of jurisdiction merely by incanting broad generalizations about the gravity of narcotics abuse in the military.15
This total disregard of the Supreme Court's mandate undermines
the Court's attempt at providing some military defendants with
the individual liberties otherwise available only through the civilian legal system.
This Note explores the service-connection requirement and military courts' application of the requirement to service personnel
charged with drug-related offenses. Part I outlines the organization and constitutional basis of the court-martial system. By contrasting the civilian and military judicial systems, this Note
demonstrates the serious disadvantages suffered by defendants in
military courts. Part II traces the Supreme Court's development
of the service-connection test for military courts' jurisdiction.
Part III summarizes the military courts' application of the serviceconnection test to drug-related offenses, and emphasizes the Court
of Military Appeals' recent reinterpretation and expansion of the
jurisdiction of courts-martial. Part IV analyzes and critiques the
military courts' redefinition of the service-connection test, and
suggests that the military courts' current approach violates the
Supreme Court's precedential explication of this jurisdictional
requirement.
12. Note, Federal Civilian Court Intervention in Pending Courts-Martial and the
Proper Scope of Military Jurisdiction Over Criminal Defendants: Schlesinger v.
Councilman and McLucas v. Dechamplain, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 432, 469-71
(1976); see, e.g., Rainville v. Lee, 22 C.M.A. 464, 464-65, 47 C.M.R. 554, 554-55 (1973).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 342 (C.M.A. 1980); United States
v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414, 416 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Moore, 1 M.J. 448, 450 (C.M.A.
1976).
14. In United States v. Trottier, the Court of Military Appeals questioned its
"slavish" application of the Relford criteria. See United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337,
343-45 (C.M.A.1980). This decision was characterized as a return to a per se rule, see
in!ra note 171 and accompanying text, and military courts have adhered to such an
approach, see in!ra notes 172, 177, 189 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 78-79 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v.
Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 345 (C.M.A.1980).
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Military Courts: The Society Apart

Article I of the Constitution empowers Congress to "make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces."16 Pursuant to this provision, Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice17 and created a system of courtsmartial independent of the federal courts established under Article IlLIS This separate military system has developed its own procedures and defined its own crimes and sanctions.19
In light of Article 1's explicit grant of congressional power, and
in deference to the particular needs of the military, the Supreme
Court has taken a very limited role in developing and supervising
military courts.20 Until relatively recently, all federal courts
lacked power to review directly the substantive determinations of
military courts; instead, the courts were limited to a collateral review of the military courts' personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. 21 Further, although Congress's 1983 amendments to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice gave parties in military tribunals the right to submit writs of certiorari to the Supreme COurt,22
the avenues for direct review remain limited.23 The military and
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
17. Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 108 (1950) (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982 & Supp. II (1984)). The statutory outline is
augmented by the U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANuAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES 1984 (rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as MANuAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL], as
authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, see 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1982).
18. D. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3
(1982).
19. Id.
20. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1952). The Court stated:
Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and
apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.
This Court has played no role in its development; we have exerted no supervisory power over the courts which enforce it; the rights of men in the
armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies
which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment.
The Framers expressly entrusted that task to Congress.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
21. See Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950) (stating that a court-martial has
sole jurisdiction over the accused, and that any errors it may have committed are
solely the concern of the military authorities); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890)
(because civil courts exercise no supervisory powers over courts-martial, courtmartial errors are not open to consideration by civilian courts); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 253 (1863) (stating that a court of military commission exercises a special authority).
22. Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, § 10(c)(2), 97 Stat. 1393, 140506 (1983) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 867(h) (Supp. II 1984)).
23. In deference to concerns about the Supreme Court's docket, Congress limited
the number of decisions subject to direct review. H.R. REp. No. 549, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess.16, 17 (1983). Only decisions by the highest military court, the Court of Military
Appeals, are subject to review. See 10 U.S.C. § 867(h)(1) (Supp. II 1984). If the Court
of Military Appeals does not grant a petition for review, the Supreme Court has complete discretion to refuse to grant petitions for writs of certiorari. H.R. REP. No. 549,
supra, at 17.
Lower federal courts remain limited to a collateral review of the military court's
personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738,
746,758 (1975).

120

VOL.

54:118

Military Courts' Jurisdiction
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

its court system thus remain a "society apart from civilian
society."24
Members of the military who are unfortunate enough to appear
as defendants before military courts face a tribunal far different
from its civilian counterpart. Over the past four decades, Congress has extensively reformed the military court system,25 and
the military has, itself, extended a panoply of constitutional protections to its defendants.26 Yet, despite these reforms, defendants
tried in military courts suffer serious disadvantages that do not
afflict defendants in civilian courts - disadvantages rooted in both
the Constitution and the nature of the military COurts.27
Defendants in military courts are not necessarily entitled to all
the procedural protections available to defendants in civilian
courts. Although the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to a
grand jury indictment, the Amendment specifically excludes
"cases arising in the land or naval forces."28 Further, the Supreme
24. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1973). Many commentators have questioned
the theoretical justification for the separate society. See, e.g., Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Contro~ 82 YALE L.J. 1398, 1416-17 (1973); Warren, The Bill of
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187-203 (1962); Zillman &
Imwinkelried, Constitutional Rights and Military Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 396, 434-36 (1975). But see Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975) (stating that the military must insist upon a respect for
duty and discipline without counterpart in civilian life); Bishop, Perspective: The Case
for Military Justice, 62 MIL. L. REV. 215, 221-24 (1973) (favoring expansion of the role
of an independent military judiciary).
25. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 108 (1950) (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)) (consolidating, revising, and
codifying the Articles of War, Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard); Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82
Stat. 1335 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) (establishing courts
of military review); Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) (authorizing certain protections to the accused
in courts-martial).
26. See United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 640, 37 C.M.R. 249, 260 (1967)
(Miranda warnings); United States v. Schalck, 14 C.M.A. 371, 374, 34 C.M.R. 151, 154
(1964) (right to a speedy trial); United States v. Vierra, 14 C.M.A. 48, 53-54, 33 C.M.R.
260, 265-66 (1963) (freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures); United States
v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960) (right to confront witnesses). See generally AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND MILrrARY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(1982) (analyzing the compatibility of the Federal Rules with court-martial procedure
and military law).
27. See U.S. G.A.O., FuNDAMENTAL CHANGES NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE INDEPENDENCE AND EFFICIENCY OF THE MILrrARY JUSTICE SYSTEM 40 (1978) (suggesting that
organizational changes are needed for substantive improvements in the independence
of the military's judicial system); West, A History of Command Influence on the Military Judicial System, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 150-51 (1970) (asserting that commanding
officers still exert substantial undue influence over courts-martial); Comment, The
Military Justice Act of1968: Congress Takes Half-Steps Against Unlawful Command
Influence, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 429, 440-41 (1969) (arguing that the Military Justice Act
of 1968 is ineffective against command influence).
28. U.S. CaNST. amend. V.

Court has held that the Constitution does not guarantee the right
to trial by jury in military COurtS.29 Though each of these deprivations is significant, a military defendant's inability to secure a trial
by jury is the more serious. 30
Article III of the Constitution provides: "The trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . ."31 The
Sixth Amendment reaffirms the right to trial by jury: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . ."32 The
Supreme Court has characterized trial by jury as the citizen's bulwark against governmental oppression,33 and has emphasized the
jury's importance by expanding the criminal defendant's right to a
trial by an impartial jury of his peers. The Court has protected
the right to trial by jury by applying the requirement to state
courts as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment
when the accused is charged with a serious crime,34 by holding
juries with fewer than six members unconstitutional,35 by requiring unanimous verdicts from six-person juries,36 and by ensuring
the impartiality and representativeness of the jury.37 Indeed, trial
29. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
40 (1942). See generally Van Loan, The Jury, the Court-Martial, and the Constitution,
57 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 410-11 (1972) (arguing that the framers did not intend to
require trial by jury in military tribunals and that the omission of a specific exception
from the Sixth Amendment was an oversight).
30. The Uniform Code of Military Justice has partially remedied the unavailability of the right to a grand jury indictment by requiring a "thorough and impartial
investigation of all matters set forth in a charge or specification." 10 U.S.C. § 832(a)
(1982). In a precourt-martial investigation, the accused now has the right to counsel,
the right to present evidence, and the right to cross-examine witnesses. 10 U.S.C.
§ 832(b) (1982). However, unlike constitutional protections, these rights can be curtailed through the normal legislative process. Moreover, upon completion of the investigation, the convening authority, not a grand jury, determines whether the
evidence warrants a trial. See 10 U.S.C. § 834 (Supp. II 1984). On the other hand, the
right to indictment by a grand jury, unlike the right to a jury trial, has not been incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884), and therefore is not necessarily available in all state courts
where servicemembers accused of non-service-connected crimes may be tried.
D. EMERSON, GRAND JURY REFORM: A REVIEW OF KEY ISSUES 11-12 (1983). Thus,
defendants in courts-martial are not necessarily deprived of a civilian right to a grand
jury.
31. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2.
32. U.S. CaNST. amend. VI.
33. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
34. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968).
35. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978). The Court analyzed psychological studies and found that the reliability of juries containing fewer than six people is
seriously impaired. See id.; accord Comment, Military Triers of Fact: A Needless
Deprivation of Constitutional Protections?, 33 HAsTINGS L.J. 727, 744-45 (1982) (discussing the inadequate fact-finding capabilities of small juries).
36. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979).
37. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975) (right to petit jury selected
from a representative section of the community is violated by systematic exclusion of
women from jury panels); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 (1968) (overturning conviction because statute excluded potential jurors if they stated they had
"conscientious scruples" against capital punishment).
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by jury is considered a jewel of Anglo-American jurisprudence.3s
Nevertheless, military courts try defendants without this fundamental protection.
Military and Article III courts also differ in the essential nature
of their respective judiciaries. Defendants tried in federal civilian
courts are protected by Article III's requirement of an independent judiciary.39 Article III judges are essentially uninfluenced by
the prosecutor or other branches of the government;40 the judges'
sole purpose is to administer justice.41. Moreover, judges' independence and objectivity are protected by tenure and undiminishable
salary, as well as by longstanding judicial tradition.42
The court-martial system stands in stark contrast to the civilian
courts. Courts-martial serve a dual role: they both administer justice and enforce the military's need for discipline and efficiency.43
Generally, a court-martial is an ad hoc tribunal convened by a
commanding officer to hear a specific case.44 As the convening authority, the commanding officer can exert substantial influence
over the court-martial's proceeding.45 He decides not only
whether to pursue a case, but also what type of court-martial to
convene.46 The officer's selection of a general, special, or summary court-martial determines the punishments that may be imposed and the protections that are available to the defendant.47
No matter what forum is selected, the accused has the right to
select a trial by a panel of servicemembers, rather than solely by a
38. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379 (stating that trial by jury is "the most
transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy").
39. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; United States ex Tel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11,
16 (1955).
40. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1933).
41. See United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 43-44 (1959) (Article III
courts constitutionally prohibited from exercising powers of an executive or legislative nature); see also C. ANTIEAu, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 11.13-11.15 (1979)
(constitutional provisions protecting the separation of powers prohibit both the impairment of Article III courts' independence and the exercise of legislative or executive power by Article III courts).
42. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; United States ex Tel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11,
16 (1955); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 264 (1969). The independence of statecourt judges is not always as well guaranteed. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 683 n.14 (1979).
43. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1969).
44. D. SCHLUETER, supra note 18, at 13.
45. See U.S. G.A.O., supra note 27, at 6-7.
46. 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-24 (1982).
47. The general court-martial is the highest trial level. It may comprise a military
judge sitting alone, if requested by the defendant, or a military judge and a panel of
not less than five members. 10 U.S.C. § 816(1) (Supp. II 1984). The general courtmartial may prescribe any punishment allowed in the Maximum Punishment Chart,
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 17, at A12-1 to A12-8, including the death penalty,
confinement at hard labor for up to 20 years, or a dishonorable discharge. If the defendant opts for a panel, a verdict need be unanimous only if death is the mandatory
punishment. 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(1) (1982). For a sentence in excess of 10 years, three-
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military judge or commissioned officer.48 If the defendant requests a panel, the convening authority selects the panel members.49 Thus, the individual who, after an initial review of the
case, signed the charges and decided that the case warranted a
trial also selects the panel that will try the accused.50 Moreover,
panel members, aware that the convening authority can affect
their progress in the military and respectful of their superiors, are
often subject to the subtle or direct influence of the commanding
officer who has already indicated that a defendant should stand
trial.51 Further, the panels tend to be unrepresentative of the milfourths of the members must concur, id. § 852(b)(2), and, for other guilty verdicts,
only two-thirds need concur, id. § 852(b)(3).
The special court-martial is the intermediate court in the military judicial structure
and may be comprised of a single military judge, a minimum of three members without a military judge, or a military judge and three panel members. Id. § 816(2). The
special court-martial may try any noncapital offense, but the maximum sentences it
may impose are six months confinement, three months hard labor without confinement, six months forfeiture of two-thirds pay, demotion, or a bad conduct discharge.
Id. § 819.
The summary court-martial may be convened only with the accused's consent. Id.
§ 820. One commissioned officer, who need not be a lawyer, presides. Id. § 816. The
maximum punishment is one month's confinement, hard labor without confinement
for 45 days, restriction to specified limits for two months, or forfeiture of two-thirds of
one month's pay. Id. § 820. Because the summary court-martial cannot imprison the
defendant, the defendant has no right to appointed counsel. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
Commanders are also empowered to impose nonjudicial punishments, including
correctional custody for up to 30 days, reduction in pay, restrictions, extra duties and
forfeiture of up to seven day's pay. 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). A servicemember may, however, refuse nonjudicial punishment and demand a courtmartial, except when on a vessel at sea. Id. § 815(a) (1982).
48. Although summary courts-martial and nonjudicial punishment do not provide
for trial by a panel of servicemembers, 10 U.S.C. §§ 816(3), 815(b) (1982 & Supp. II
1984), the accused must acquiesce before the initiation of a summary court-martial, id.
§ 820 (1982), and in most cases must consent to the infliction of nonjudicial punishments, id. § 815(a). If a servicemember objects to these proceedings, he will be tried
by either special or general court-martial; in both cases he has the right to trial by a
panel of servicemembers. Id. § 816(1)-(2) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
49. 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1982).
50. Id. §§ 825(d)(2), 830(a). After a pretrial investigation, see id. § 832(a), and
upon the advice of the staff judge advocate, see id. § 834(a) (Supp. II 1984), the convening authority independently decides whether to refer charges to trial. See id. § 830(b)
(1982). Generally, the convening authority's decision to refer the case to a courtmartial is sacrosanct. See D. SCHLUETER, supra note 18, at 202.
51. Congress enacted the Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat.
1335 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.), to redress the overwhelming potential for command influence. See S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1968). The modifications failed to eradicate the problem: the Act's vague language
grants the convening authority wide discretion in selecting panel members and requires only that he select individuals who, "in his opinion, are best qualified for the
duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial
temperament." 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1982).
Legal scholars have attacked the 1968 Act. Luther C. West states: "The real cause
of the disease itself ... remains uninhibited by [the 1968 Act's] changes. The military
judicial setting is still dominated by military commanders, from the inception of
charges to the completion of appellate review . . . ." West, A History of Command
Influence on the Military Judicial System, 18 UCLA L. REv. 1, 151 (1970). See also
Remcho, Military Juries: Constitutional Analysis and the Needfor Reform, 47 IND.
L.J. 193, 195 (1972) (general critique of military juries); Comment, Stacked Juries: A
Problem of Military Injustice, 11 SANTA CLARA LAw. 362, 374 (1970) (observing that
when an enlisted man elects trial by a panel as provided by the 1968 Act, he is usually
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itary community: they are normally comprised of commissioned
officers or senior noncommissioned officers.52 Thus, enlisted personnel are judged not by their peers, but by members of the command structure.53
Not surprisingly, court-martial panels are widely perceived as
biased in favor of the military authorities.54 Indeed, the Court of
Military Appeals itself has recognized that court-martial panels,
handpicked by a commanding officer and requiring less than a
unanimous vote by their five or fewer members for a valid conviction, are a far cry from the impartial jury trials that the Supreme
Court has mandated in civilian criminal trialS.55
Finally, unlike Article III judges, military judges are not protected by tenure or an undiminishable salary.56 Although the Military Justice Act of 1968 created a field judiciary of full-time
judges assigned directly to the Judge Advocate General,57 the military judge's independence remains circumscribed by the judge's
position as an officer in the very branch of the government that
prosecutes the defendants appearing before the judge.58
In sum, military courts afford defendants significantly fewer
protections than do their civilian counterparts. Not only is the
military defendant denied certain fundamental civil rights, such as
trial by an impartial jury, he is also judged by decisionmakers
whose impartiality is not guaranteed.
faced with officers and noncommissioned officers, thereby increasing rather than
reducing command influence).
52. Remcho, supra note 51, at 195; Comment, supra note 51, at 374.
53. In contrast, courts struggle to assure that civilian juries remain impartial and
representative. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
54. Court-martial panels are criticized both by legal scholars, see infra note 51,
and by servicemembers. One survey asked military defendants whether the military
panels in their cases were "fair and unbiased:" 17.1% answered yes, 63.4% said no, and
19.5% did not know. The survey's author concluded: "[I]t is unlikely that the strongly
negative attitudes of military defendants would be duplicated among the civilian prisoner population." Pitkin, The Military Justice System: An Analysis from the Defendant's Perspective, 29 JAG 251,267-268 (1977); see also Remcho, supra note 51, at 196
(suggesting that few enlisted personnel elect the jury option because of fear of bias in
favor of military authorities on the part of senior noncommissioned officers).
55. See United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26, 29 n.3 (C.M.A. 1976). Five-member
panels do not meet the base size and voting requirements that the Supreme Court has
found necessary to avoid seriously impairing the functioning of juries. See supra
notes 35-36 and accompanying text. The General Accounting Office has recommended that Congress require random selection of military jurors and consider enlarging the size of juries. U.S. G.A.O., MILITARY JURY SYSTEM NEEDS SAFEGUARDS
FOUND IN CIVILIAN FEDERAL COURTS 44 (1977).
56. See United States ex reI. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
57. See 10 U.S.C. § 826(c) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
58. See Pitkin, supra note 54, at 257-58. Congress has recognized the problem of
judicial independence, and has required the establishment of a commission to evaluate changes needed "to ensure maintenance of an independent military judiciary,
including a term of tenure." Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209,
§ 9(b)(3)(D), 97 Stat. 1393, 1405 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 867 note (Supp. II 1984)).

IL

The Supreme Court: Restrictions On Military
Courts' Jurisdiction

Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged both the constitutional basis and the necessity for restricting the rights of military defendants, the Court has also attempted to ameliorate these
deprivations by progressively restricting the jurisdiction of the
military COurtS.59 To balance the necessity for Article I military
tribunals with the need to protect the constitutional rights of individual military defendants,60 the Court has limited Congress's
power to authorize trial by court-martial to "'the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed.' "61
In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,62 the first in a series of
decisions limiting military courts' jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
held that military courts lack jurisdiction over ex-servicemembers
- even if the ex-servicemembers are charged with crimes allegedly committed while on active duty.63 The Quarles Court strictly
construed Congress's power to vest military courts with jurisdictional authority, based partly on the Court's conclusion that military courts lack the qualifications that the Constitution deems
essential to fair civil trials.54 In Reid v. Covert,65 the Court further
narrowed the jurisdiction of courts-martial, holding that military
courts lack jurisdiction to try and imprison civilians, even if the
civilians are dependents of servicemembers and live on a military
base overseas.66 The Court again emphasized the limitations inherent in military justice,67 stressing that every extension of military courts' jurisdiction encroaches on the jurisdiction of the civil
courts, and "acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial and of
other treasured constitutional protections:'68 Quarles, Reid, and
several later decisions69 stripped the military courts of jurisdiction
over civilians and laid down the first of two prerequisites for jurisdiction of a court-martial: military status. 70
In 1969, the Supreme Court took a giant step forward, and for
59. See infra notes 62-89 and accompanying text.
60. See Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 362-63 (1971); O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969).
•
61. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (quoting United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (emphasis in original».
62. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
63. See id. at 23.
64. See id. at 14-15,17.
65. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
66. See id. at 19.
67. See id. at 35-36.
68. fd. at 21.
69. See Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960) (military dependant cannot
be tried for noncapital offenses); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284-86 (1960)
(no jurisdiction over civilian employees); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 582-83
(1958) (no jurisdiction over military personnel for crimes committed before
induction).
70. See D. SCHLUETER, supra note 18, at 126. In dictum, the Reid Court expressed
that military courts might have jurisdiction to try a civilian only if the civilian is arrested in an area of actual fighting. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 33-35.
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the first time denied a military court jurisdiction to try an active
servicemember. In O'Callahan v. Parker,71 a sergeant in the
United States Army was charged with housebreaking, attempted
rape, and assault with intent to rape while properly off-base and
on leave.72 The Supreme Court held that the defendant's military
status, although necessary, was not sufficient to establish the military court's jurisdiction.73 The Court enunciated the further requirement that for a court-martial to have jurisdiction, the alleged
offense "must be service connected."74 If it is not, the defendant is
entitled to a trial in a civilian COurt.75
In restricting the military court's jurisdiction over active servicemembers, the O'Callahan Court emphasized the constitutional
stakes, the weaknesses in court-martial proceedings, and the
threat to liberty engendered by any unnecessary expansion of military discipline.76 In a vehement condemnation of the military
courts, the Court stated: "[C]ourts-martial as an institution are
singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutionallaw . . . ."77
In enumerating the service-connection requirement, the Court
engendered some confusion by failing to formulate any simple test
for determining the presence or absence of service connection in a
given case.78 Instead, the Court discussed a series of factors indicating the lack of service connection: the defendant was properly
absent from the base; the crime was committed off a military post;
there was no connection between the defendant's military duties
and the crime; the offense was committed within the United
States' territorial limits, during peacetime; and the offense did not
threaten military security, property, or authority.79
Two years later, in a unanimous decision, the Court attempted
to clarify o'Callahan, refining the service-connection test by
applying it in a different factual context. In Relford v. Comman71. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).

72. fd. at 260.
73. See id. at 267 ("[C]ourt-martial jurisdiction cannot be extended to reach any
person not a member of the Armed Forces at the times of both the offense and the
trial.").
74. fd. at 272.
75. fd. at 273-74.
76. See id. at 262-65.
77. fd. at 265. The Court further observed: "A civilian trial . . . is held in an
atmosphere conducive to the protection of individual rights, while a military trial is
marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice." [d. at 266 (footnote
omitted).
78. Comment, O'Callahan v. Parker, A Military Jurisdictional Dilemma, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 64, 69 (1970); Note, Constitutional Law - Non-Military Offenses Committed OffPost While on Leave Not Justiciable by Courts Martia~ 18 U. KAN. L. REv.
335, 340-41 (1970); 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 630, 634 (1970).
79. See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 273-74.
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dant,80 the Court granted a court-martial jurisdiction over an
Army corporal charged with kidnapping and raping two civilians
who were properly within the military enclave.81 In reviewing the
propriety of the jurisdiction of courts-martial, the Supreme Court
again emphasized the tension between constitutional guarantees
for individual citizens and constitutional provisions for the establishment of a military court system.82 To clarify the serviceconnection analysis, the Relford Court listed the criteria emphasized in o 'Callahan, 83 stressed nine considerations relevant to a
service-connection inquiry,84 and sanctioned an ad hoc approach
for determining the presence of service connection.85 The Court
apparently felt that only by carefully analyzing each case in light
of a series of service-connection factors could courts balance the
fundamental rights of the defendant and the legitimate exercise of
military courts' power.86 The Court recognized that its ad hoc approach left "outer boundaries undetermined,"87 but concluded
that Corporal Relford's alleged crimes were service connected.88
Finally, the Court opined that its holding fully comported with
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

401 U.S. 355 (1971).
See id. at 360-61.
See id. at 362-63.
See id. at 365.
The Court stressed:
(a) The military's interest in the security of persons and property on the
military enclave;
(b) the military commander's responsibility and authority to maintain
order;
(c) the adverse effect of crime upon the morale, discipline, reputation, and
integrity of the base and its personnel, and upon the military operation
and mission;
(d) the conviction that article I vests Congress with the power to grant
military courts the jurisdiction to try and punish military offenders;
(e) the distinct possibility that civil, particularly nonfederal, courts will
inadequately assess and respect the military's disciplinary authority
within its own community;
(f) the O'CaZlahan Court's implication that geographical and military relationships are important factors for ruling out a service connection;
(g) the O'CaZlahan Court's recognition that even the Continental Congress allowed military jurisdiction over crimes by service members against
individuals associated with a military base;
(h) the impropriety of interpreting the O'Callahan decision as confining
the court-martial to purely military offenses with no counterpart in nonmilitary criminal law; and
(i) the Court's inability to draw a meaningful distinction between strictly
military and nonmilitary areas, or between a serviceman-defendant's onduty and off-duty activities and hours on the military post.
See id. at 367-69.
85. See id. at 365-66, 369; see also United States v. Moore, 1 M.J. 448, 450 (C.M.A.
1976) (opining that the Relford Court constitutionalized the need for a detailed analysis of the enumerated jurisdictional criteria to resolve the service-connection issue).
86. See Relford, 401 U.S. at 369.
87. [d. The Court elaborated: "O'CaZZahan marks an area, perhaps not the limit,
for the concern of the civil courts and where the military may not enter. The case
today marks an area, perhaps not the limit, where the court-martial is appropriate
and permissible. What lies between is for decision at another time." [d.
88. See id. at 367, 369. The Court emphasized that the crimes were committed on
a military base, the victims were properly on the base, tangible personal property on
the base was impaired, and the security of the installation was threatened. [d. at 36667. In final analysis, the Court formulated a limited per se rule: "a serviceman's
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the O'Callahan standard for limiting military courts' jurisdiction
to "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."89
In 1975, the Supreme Court was once again faced with an opportunity to refine the service-connection test. In Schlesinger v.
Councilman,90 the Court refused to enjoin a pending courtmartial, despite the defendant's assertion that his alleged acts
were not service connected.91 The Court avoided the merits of the
defendant's service-connection defense,92 choosing instead to limit
the power of Article III courts to intervene in pending courtmartial proceedings.93
In reaching its decision, the Court reemphasized that, "[of]
course, if the offenses with which [the defendant] is charged are
not 'service connected,' the military courts will have had no power
to impose any punishment whatever."94 The Court departed from
Justice Douglas's earlier scathing criticism of the military COurtS,95
however, and stated that, in deference to Congress's judgment as
embodied in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Court was
required to assume that military courts can safeguard defendants'
crime against the person of an individual upon the base or against property on the
base is 'service connected' . . . ." Id. at 369.
89. Id. at 369 (quoting O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265).
90. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
91. See id. at 740. While off-post and off-duty, the defendant allegedly transferred
small quantities of marijuana to an undercover agent who represented that he was
also off-duty. Id. at 740-41.
92. See id. at 743-44. Proceeding to the service-connection inquiry, the dissenting
justices conducted an ad hoc analysis employing the Relford criteria, and found no
service connection. See id. at 767 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
93. See id. at 758. Unlike the defendants in Relford and O'Callahan, who had
exhausted their rights to review in the military-court system and had filed their
habeas corpus petitions only upon actual imprisonment, see 401 U.S. at 362; 395 U.S. at
261, the defendant in Councilman sought to enjoin his pending court-martial, see 420
U.S. at 741-42. Although the Supreme Court did not hold that Congress had limited
Article III court review of military court proceedings exclusively to habeas corpus
proceedings, the Court found that Captain Councilman had not suffered such irreparable harm as to justify the extraordinary relief of enjoining a pending court-martial.
See id. at 754-55. The Court withheld the district court's remedial power because the
accused could "show no harm other than that attendant to resolution of his case in the
military-court system." Id. at 758. Councilman was thereby required to pursue his
rights through the military court system. See id. at 759-60. The Court in no way limited Councilman's ultimate right to seek review of the military court's assertion of
jurisdiction after exhausting his rights in the military courts. See id. at 758.
The Court reaffirmed Councilman in McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21, 33-34
(1975) (" 'When a serviceman . . . can show no harm other than that attendant to
resolution of his case in the military court system, the federal district courts must
refrain from intervention.''') (quoting Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758). It remains unclear what situation might justify a federal court's intervention in court-martial proceedings other than by habeas corpus relief. See Bartley, Military Law in the 1970's:
The Effects of Schlesinger v. Councilman, 17 A.F.L. REv., Winter 1975, at 65, 71.
94. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 760.
95. See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265-66.

constitutional rights. 96 The Court recognized that the serviceconnection inquiry is a matter within the singular expertise of
military courts, and concluded that military courts' judgments are
indispensable to an informed review by Article III COurtS.97 Yet,
notwithstanding this apparent reassessment of military courts'
competence, the Councilman Court reaffirmed the ad hoc approach of Relford and concluded that the service-connection determination "often will turn on the precise set of facts in which
the offense has occurred."98 The ad hoc test thus remained the
linchpin of the Court's service-connection analysis.
The chief consequence of Schlesinger v. Councilman has been a
substantial restriction of Article III courts' review of military
courts' determinations.99 Thus, since Councilman, military courts
have been the primary arena for litigating the service-connection
doctrine. This Note now analyzes military courts' development of
the service-connection test, focusing on the courts' application of
the test to drug-related offenses. This Note concludes that the
current approach of military courts - a per se approach that holds
virtually all drug-related offenses involving servicemembers to be
service connected - violates the Supreme Court's test for military
courts' jurisdiction.

III Military Courts' Application of the ServiceConnection Requirement to Drug-Related Offenses
During the late 1960s, the military experienced a growing drugabuse problem,loo and, in the ensuing years, military courts
96. See Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758 ("[I]mplicit in the congressional scheme embodied in the Code is the view that the military court system generally is adequate to
and responsibly will perform its assigned task.").
97. See id. at 760.
98. See id. (citing Relford, 401 U.S. at 365-66).
99. By restricting federal courts' review of military cases to habeas corpus petitions, and by leaving only a narrow undefined opening for equitable jurisdiction when
a servicemember can show harm other than that attendant to the resolution of a case,
the Court closed the paths by which many military defendants had reached Article III
courts. See, e.g., Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that a federal
conviction for drug possession is sufficient for judicial review even though defendant
failed to exhaust existing military remedies); Gerko v. Commanding Officer, 314 F.2d
858 (10th Cir. 1963) (in light of Sixth Amendment's provision for a speedy trial, judicial review granted to determine whether military court properly exercised jurisdiction over defendant whose term of enlistment expired prior to date of court-martial
proceedings); Redmond v. Warner, 353 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Hawaii 1973) (holding that
defendant's good faith allegation that court-martial is without jurisdiction is sufficient
to establish grounds for Article III courts' review); Moylan v. Laird, 305 F. Supp. 551
(D.R.I. 1969) (off-base possession of marijuana established substantial question as to
military court's jurisdiction appropriate for Article III court review); see also Bartley,
supra note 93, at 78 ("The difficulty of surmounting the equitable jurisdiction requirement makes it doubtful that the [service-connection] issue will come before the Court
again in the near future.").
100. See Use of Drugs in the Military Services: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
the Dep't of Defense of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 252
(1971) (investigations of drug use in the Army, Navy, and Air Force climbed from
2,482 in 1966 to 37,208 in 1970).
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processed many drug-related cases.101 Although most off-base
offenses are clearly not service-connected, the military has long
argued that drug-related offenses pose unique problems and that
even those committed off-base are service-connected.102 As a consequence, the service-connection inquiry frequently has been litigated in cases involving drug-related offenses.
The Court of Military Appeals/o3 the supreme military court,
has taken the lead in formulating military courts' serviceconnection analysis. Immediately after the Supreme Court decided O'Callahan, the Court of Military Appeals broadly held, in
United States 'V. Beeker,104 that both wrongful use and wrongful
possession of marijuana or narcotics "on or off base, has singular
military significance which carries [each] act outside the limitation
on military jurisdiction set out in the O'Callahan case."105 Under
this per se rule, military courts concluded that servicemembers
accused of any drug-related offense - wherever or whenever
committed - were automatically subject to courts-martial. For
the next seven years, the per se rule was applied to all cases involving drug-related offenses in the military COurts.106
In marked contrast to the military courts' per se approach to
determining jurisdiction in drug-related cases, the lower Article
III courts properly employed the Supreme Court's ad hoc analysis
and consistently restricted military courts' jurisdiction over defendants charged with off-base offenses involving nonaddictive
drugs.107 Thus, for a number of years immediately following the
101. [d. at 253 (by 1970, the Department of Defense reported 4,908 courts-martial
and 5,906 nonjudicial punishments for drug-related offenses).
102. Supplemental Brief on Behalf of the United States at 15-16, United States v.
Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 344 n.18 (C.M.A. 1980).
103. The Court of Military Appeals is a civilian appellate forum attached to the
Department of Defense that reviews questions of law arising from decisions by Courts
of Military Review. 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(1), (d) (1982). The President appoints the
three civilian judges for 15-year terms. [d. § 867(a)(1). The Court of Military Appeals
reviews all lower military-court decisions involving death sentences, id. § 867(b)(1)
(Supp. II 1984), cases certified by a Judge Advocate General, id. § 867(b)(2) (1982), and
hears some cases after accepting an accused's petition for review, id. § 867(b)(2). See
generally Cooke, The United States Court of Military Appeals, 1975-1977: Judicializing the Military Justice System, 76 MIL. L. REv. 43 (1977) (discussing the court's authority, operation, and related jurisdictional issues).
104. 18 C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969).
105. [d. at 565, 40 C.M.R. at 277.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Sexton, 23 C.M.A. 101, 103, 48 C.M.R. 662, 664 (1974)
(oral agreement to sell marijuana and the transfer of money at the base is a serviceconnected offense); Rainville v. Lee, 22 C.M.A. 464, 464, 47 C.M.R. 555, 555 (1973) (offbase possession, use, and sale of marijuana while off duty and out of uniform held
service connected); United States v. Adams, 19 C.M.A. 75, 76, 41 C.M.R. 75, 76 (1969)
(possession of marijuana, whether on- or off-base, is service connected); United States
v. Rose, 19 C.M.A. 3, 4, 41 C.M.R. 3, 4 (1969) (possession and delivery of barbiturates,
whether on- or off-base, is service connected).
107. See, e.g., Peterson v. Goodwin, 512 F.2d 479,480 (5th Cir.) (off-base possession

O'Callahan decision, the military and Article III courts took
sharply different views of the meaning of service connection.
In 1976, however, the Court of Military Appeals acknowledged
its "own prior analytical shortcomings,"108 and overruled Beeker
and its per se approach to jurisdiction over drug offenses.109 The
Court of Military Appeals adopted an "analytical process of carefully balancing the Relford criteria. . . on a case-by-case, offenseby-offense basis,"llo and began reading the Supreme Court's opinions as a mandate to abandon any simplistic formulations of the
service-connection test. ll1 The ad hoc approach mandated by the
Supreme Court in Relford thus became the cornerstone of the
service-connection analysis in both Article III and military
COurtS. l12
In 1980, however, the Court of Military Appeals again drastically altered its interpretation of the service-connection requirement. In United States v. Trottier,113 a special court-martial
convicted the defendant of selling marijuana and lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD) to an Air Force informant at an off-base
apartment.1l4 Because the informant professed an intention to
distribute the drugs on a military base, the Court of Military Appeals could have found a service connection based on precedent.1l5
Instead, the court chose to extend its analysis beyond the facts
before it and to reconsider completely its interpretation of the service-connection requirement. 1l6
The Trottier court concluded that "almost every involvement of
service personnel with the commerce in drugs is 'service
of heroin, an addictive drug, is service connected due to its unique threat to base operation), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975); Councilman v. Laird, 481 F.2d 613, 614 (10th
Cir. 1973) (off-base sale and transfer of marijuana to an undercover enlisted person
not service connected), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Schlesinger v. Councilman,
420 U.S. 738, 740 (1975); Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829,833 (5th Cir. 1972) (off-base, offduty possession and use of marijuana while in civilian clothes not service connected);
Holder v. Richardson, 364 F. Supp. 1207, 1210, 1212 (D.D.C. 1973) (wrongful use and
possession of marijuana off-base not service connected); Redmond v. Warner, 355
F. Supp. 812, 816 (D. Hawaii 1973) (off-base, off-duty possession and sale of controlled
substances to servicemember in civilian clothes not service connected); Schroth v.
Warner, 353 F. Supp. 1032, 1043 (D. Hawaii 1973) (off-base possession and transfer of
controlled substances to undercover serviceman not service connected); Lyle v.
Kincaid, 344 F. Supp. 223, 225 (off-base possession of small amount of marijuana not
service connected), modified, 352 F. Supp. 81 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
108. United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26, 28 n.1, 28-29 (C.M.A. 1976).
109. See id. at 29.
110. United States v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414, 416 (C.M.A. 1977).
111. See, e.g., id.; United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26, 28 (C.M.A. 1976); United
States v. Moore, 1 M.J. 448, 450 (C.M.A. 1976).
112. The Court of Military Appeals zealously adhered to the Supreme Court's
analysis and mandated that the government affirmatively establish the Relford factors through sworn pleadings. See United States v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414, 419 (C.M.A. 1977).
113. 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980).
114. Id. at 338-39.
115. Id. at 339. In prior decisions, the Court of Military Appeals had consistently
held that sale of narcotics to a servicemember who professed the intention to introduce the narcotics on a military installation was service connected. See, e.g., United
States v. Chambers, 7 M.J. 24, 24 (C.M.A. 1979).
116. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 339.
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connected.' "117 In reaching that conclusion, the court did not return completely to the per se approach of Beeker; 118 it noted that
in unusual circumstances certain drug-related offenses might not
be service connected.119 Yet, the Trottier court greatly minimized
the importance of the ad hoc approach mandated by the Relford
decision. 120 Instead, the court postulated that military courts have
jurisdiction over whole classes of drug offenses and that courts
need not take an ad hoc approach in every case.121 Ultimately the
Trottier Court applied the Relford criteria to the facts before it;122
however, the court made a series of sweeping generalizations that
led it to conclude that the service-connection inquiry ought to be
made far more flexible. 123 Not surprisingly, the court found the
defendant's offenses service connected.124

IV:

Critique of the Military Courts' Application
of the Service-Connection Requirement to
Drug-Related Offenses

In United States v. Trottier, the Court of Military Appeals reinterpreted the service-connection requirement in the context of
drug-related offenses, and vastly expanded its jurisdiction to try
cases involving such offenses by returning, at least in practice, to a
per se rule for military courts' jurisdiction over drug-related
117. Id. at 350 (footnote omitted).
118. See id. at 352 n.34. But see id. at 353 (Fletcher, J., concurring) (suggesting that
the majority opinion revives Beeker and "discloses. . . a lessening of the requirement
that the Government fulfill its obligation ... to meet the letter of the law").
119. See id. at 350 n.28. The court noted:
For instance, it would not appear that use of marihuana by a serviceperson
on a lengthy period of leave away from the military community would
have such an effect on the military as to warrant the invocation of a claim
of special military interest and significance adequate to support court-martial jurisdiction under O'Callahan. Similarly, the interest of the military
in the sale of a small amount of contraband substance by a military person
to a civilian for the latter's personal use seems attenuated.
Id. (citation omitted).
120. See id.
121. See id. at 345. The court asked and answered its own rhetorical question:
"[D]id the Supreme Court intend that each individual case be dealt with separately
and that no classes of cases be recognized in which military jurisdiction exists?
Relford implies that the ad hoc approach need not necessarily be taken to this extreme." Id.
122. See id. at 351-53.
123. The court emphasized the gravity of the drug problem in the armed forces,
and concluded that the problem was so severe that it required the extension of courtmartial jurisdiction "to the greatest extent legally permissible." Id. at 346. Asserting
that "[e]ven constitutional law must be molded to the times," id. at 344, the court
broadly concluded that almost all drug-related offenses involving service personnel
are service connected, see id. at 350.
124. See id. at 352-53.

cases.125 Indeed, since Trottier, the military high court has expansively interpreted its jurisdiction to hear cases involving service
members' drug offenses.126 This Note argues that the Trottier
court's rationale is seriously flawed, and that military courts' recent assertions of jurisdiction over drug-related offenses directly
contradict both the letter and spirit of the Supreme Court's
decisions requiring an ad hoc approach to assessing the serviceconnection requirement for courts'-martial jurisdiction.
In deciding Trottier, the Court of Military Appeals observed
that the Supreme Court's decision in Schlesinger v. Councilman127
arguably supports the conclusion that a "slavish" application of
the Relford criteria is no longer required.128 In Councilman, however, the Court never reached the merits of the defendant's service-connection claim.129 Instead, by limiting the power of federal
courts to enjoin pending courts-martial, the Councilman Court
avoided the service-connection issue entirely.
Although the
Court tempered its prior criticism of military courts and recognized the relevance of military courts' expertise, the Court also
reemphasized the importance of the service-connection analysis
and the need to closely analyze each factual situation.130 Indeed,
the Councilman Court cited Relford for the proposition that the
existence of service-connection "often will turn on the precise set
of facts in which the offense has occurred."131 Thus, Councilman
does not substantiate the Trottier court's redefinition of the
service-connection requirement.
The Trottier court also justified an expanded interpretation of
its jurisdiction over drug-related offenses by asserting that "constitutionallaw must be molded to the times."132 For support, the
court cited two decisions in which the Supreme Court broadly discussed the validity of interpreting constitutional principles elastically.133 In the first of the decisions relied on by the Trottier
court, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Depression created a
national emergency justifying an interpretation of the contract
clause that varied from the one offered by the framers almost a
century and a half earlier.134 The Trottier court further supported
125. See id. at 352; Schutz, Trottier and the War Against Drugs: An Update, 1983
.ARMY LAw. 20, 21, 23-24.
126. See infra notes 177-88 and accompanying text.
127. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
128. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 343. Although the Trottier court did not explicitly reject the Relford criteria, it expressed a clear preference for a "flexible application of
the concept." Id. at 345.
129. See 420 U.S. at 740; supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
130. See id. at 760.
131. Id. (citing Relford, 401 U.S. at 365-66).
132. Trottier, 9 M.J. at 344. The court apparently felt that the seriousness of drug
abuse in the armed forces justified its "molding" the service-connection requirement
to "changing conditions." See id. at 345-50.
133. See id. at 344-45 (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926»; infra notes 134-37 and
accompanying text.
134. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-45 (1934). In
Blaisdell, the Court upheld a state statute extending the time allowed for redeeming
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its assertion by citing a decision in which the Supreme Court considered the extent to which the country's demographics had
changed in the more than 130 years since the ratification of the
Constitution as a justification for rejecting a constitutional challenge to the validity of zoning laws.13s
Neither of these decisions supports the Court of Military Appeals' decision to mold the service-connection requirement to
meet the exigencies of drug abuse in the military. The Supreme
Court's decision to reinterpret a constitutional provision when
more than a century of societal changes have rendered its initial
interpretation obsolete,136 or when a national emergency has produced circumstances unforeseen by the framers,137 is simply not
analogous to the situation that confronted the Trottier court. In
Trottier, the Court of Military Appeals reinterpreted two
Supreme Court cases - O'Callahan and Relford - decided within
the preceding nine years. The gravity of drug abuse in the military had been widely recognized prior to both O'Callahan and
Relford,138 and there was neither a dramatic emergency comparable to the Depression, nor a gradual societal change justifying a
reinterpretation of the constitutionally mandated serviceconnection analysis. Nonetheless, the Court of Military Appeals
performed exactly such a reinterpretation.
The Trottier court further justified its expanded jurisdiction
under a reformulated service-connection test by emphasizing the
broad reach of Congress's war powers.139 The court asserted that
the war powers are plenary, applying equally both in wartime and
in peacetime.140 Analogizing to Congress's broad remedial powers
under the commerce clause, the court claimed that the war power
embued Congress - and, in turn, courts-martial- with the broad
power to rid the military of drug abuse and thereby preserve our
real property following foreclosure, altering preexisting contractual relations. See id.
at 447.
135. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 344-45 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
386-87 (1926) (zoning regulations that would have been invalidated 30 years earlier
can now be upheld due to increased congestion and complexity of contemporary
urban life».
136. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87.
137. See Blaisden 290 U.S. at 428.
138. See generally Donnelly, Mary Jane in Action, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1967, at 40
(discussing marijuana use by servicemembers throughout Vietnam); Marijuana
Termed Big Problem Among U.S. Troops in Vietnam, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1967 at 4,
col. 3 (finding more servicemembers arrested on marijuana charges than on any other
charge); Shuster, Addict Says He Shot 2 South Vietnamese While High, N.Y. Times,
June 15, 1966 at 1, col. 3 (servicemember testified to his use of drugs in Vietnam at
hearings in the Senate).
139. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 346-50 (stating that because Congress created the military courts pursuant to its Article I powers, Congress's war powers conferred broad
jurisdiction upon the courts-martial).
140. See id. at 347-50.

military preparedness.141
These sweeping assertions fly in the face of the Supreme
Court's precedents restricting military courts' jurisdiction. When
the war powers do not conflict with provisions in the Bill of
Rights, they, like the commerce power, are very broad;l42 however, the Supreme Court initially adopted the service-connection
test to safeguard the individual liberties of military defendants.143
In deciding Relford and O'Callahan, the Court fully considered
Congress's Article I powers and nonetheless concluded that military courts' deprivation of defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights mandated the application of a service-connection test
to limit military courts' jurisdiction.l44 Because the Commerce
Clause decisions relied upon by the Trottier COurt145 did not involve any conflict between Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce and constitutionally protected individual liberties,146
the cited decisions in no way support the Trottier court's redefinition of the service-connection requirement.
The military court further misconstrued the scope of Congress's
war powers by asserting that these powers are as broad during
peacetime as they are during war, at least as the powers apply to
servicepersons.147 In Reid v. Covert, one of the earliest decisions
in which the Supreme Court limited the jurisdiction of military
courts, the Court found the absence of hostilities fatal to the
141. See id. at 349-50.
142. The Supreme Court has generally given Congress wide discretion in its exercise of the war powers. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (prescription of curfew as an emergency war measure is within the constitutional scope of
congressional and executive discretion). However, like all of Congress's Article I
powers, the Bill of Rights limits Congress's exercise of the war powers. See Hamilton
v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919); see also 2 ANTlEAu,
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT § 12:73
(1969) (Congress's normally broad war powers are limited when they conflict with
provisions in the Bill of Rights).
143. See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272-73.
144. See Relford, 401 U.S. at 362-66; O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272-73.
145. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 348-49.
146. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(Congress may prohibit racial discrimination in public accomodations serving interstate travellers); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961) (Congress may preempt
state law by establishing standards for tobacco products); North American Co. v. SEC,
327 U.S. 686, 704-05 (1946) (Congress may regulate public-utility holding companies
engaged in interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (Congress may regulate wheat produced for personal consumption in order to control
prices in interstate commerce); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110,
125 (1942) (Congress may regulate handling of intrastate transactions so related to
interstate milk commerce as to substantially interfere with regulation of the latter);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (Congress may prohibit interstate
shipment of goods produced under substandard labor conditions); Weiss v. United
States, 308 U.S. 321, 327 (1939) (Congress may regulate intrastate communications to
protect interstate communications); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 48 (1939) (Congress
may set quotas on tobacco to avoid oversupply of tobacco); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S.
1, 13-14 (1939) (Congress may establish standards for, designate auction markets for,
and require inspection of tobacco involved in interstate-commerce transactions);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (Congress may safeguard
employees' right to organize in plant engaged in interstate commerce).
147. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 347-48.
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government's reliance on the war powers as the basis for military
jurisdiction.148 Further, in elaborating on the service-connection
requirement in O'Callahan, the Court explicitly stated: "[W]e
deal with peacetime offenses, not with authority stemming from
the war power."149
Nonetheless, the Trottier court proposed that "for trying
servicepersons, a realistic view of the role of our military in the
modern world minimizes any need for preoccupation with the
presence or absence of actual hostilities."15o The decisions that it
relied upon,151 however, in no way support a departure from the
Supreme Court's emphasis on limiting the military's peacetime
jurisdiction via a service-connection inquiry. In Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority,152 for example, the Supreme Court
took judicial notice that when Congress approved construction of
the Wilson Dam in 1916, it did so in anticipation of World War I.153
The Ashwander Court broadly construed Congress's war powers
specifically because active hostilities were anticipated.154
The Court of Military Appeals' reliance on Brown v. Glines155 to
support its assertion that the presence or absence of hostilities is
irrelevant to the scope of Congress's war powers was similarly
misplaced.156 In Brown, the Supreme Court upheld an Air Force
regulation requiring members of that service to obtain approval
from their commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force
bases.157 The restriction on freedom of speech was limited: it restricted only on-base activity and permitted the commander to disallow a petition only if the petition posed a clear danger to the
military.158 The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the
148. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1957). The Trottier court distinguished
the Reid decision as a basis for restricting military courts' jurisdiction over civilians,
and argued for expansive peacetime jurisdiction over servicepersons. See Trottier, 9
M.J. at 347.
149. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 273.
150. Trottier, 9 M.J. at 347 (emphasis in original).
151. See id. at 347 (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288
(1936); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980».
152. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
153. See id. at 327.
154. Further, unlike Trottier, the state action in Ashwander did not infringe on any
constitutionally protected individual liberties. See id. at 339-40. Instead, it involved
an attempt by a utility company's shareholders to prevent the sale of transmission
lines to the Tennessee Valley Authority. Id.
155. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
156. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 347. The Trottier court's citation of Brown shows its
limited application to exigent circumstances, emphasizing "that there are 'special dangers present in certain military situations' that 'may warrant' special 'restrictions on
the rights of military persons." Id. (quoting Brown, 444 U.S. at 356 n.14).
157. See Brown, 444 U.S. at 361.
158. Id. at 355.
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necessity of protecting the integrity of military bases.159 Indeed,
the Relford Court held that on-base violations of the security of
persons or property are per se service-connected offenses.16o At
the same time, however, Relford reasserted o'Callahan ~ reliance
on the peacetime-wartime distinction.161 Brown v. Glines did not
undermine that distinction; it merely reaffirmed the Court's acceptance of the military's special need to restrict on-base activity
that threatens military preparedness and poses a clear danger to
the military.162
Perhaps most telling of the Trottier court's refusal to accept
restrictions on military courts' jurisdiction over drug-related
offenses is the court's devaluation of the rights to trial by jury and
indictment by grand jury.163 Although military courts' denial of
these guarantees sparked the Supreme Court's enunciation of the
service-connection test,164 the Trottier court chose to emphasize
the limits of these guarantees,165 asserting that the denial of these
rights would not subject servicemembers charged with off-base
drug-related offenses to " 'drumhead justice.' "166
Finally, the Trottier court disregarded the Supreme Court's repeated warning that courts'-martial jurisdiction must be limited to
"the least possible power adequate to the end proposed. "167 While
summarily acknowledging the Supreme Court's mandate, the
Court of Military Appeals instead declared that courts-martial
must exercise jurisdiction over drug-related offenses "to the greatest extent legally permissible."168 By broadly redefining the extent of its jurisdiction, and by minimizing the importance of the
159. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (stating that the policy of
keeping on-base activities free from partisan political involvement consistent with
constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military); Relford, 401 U.S. at 369.
160. See Relford, 401 U.S. at 369.
161. See id. at 365.
162. The Court of Military Appeals seemed to recognize the tenuousness of its citation to Brown as support for disregarding the distinction between peacetime and wartime activities of servicemembers. The court admitted that Brown only "implied"
that the presence or absence of actual hostilities was no longer important. See
Trottier, 9 M.J. at 347.
163. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 351.
164. See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272-73.
165. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 351. The military court remarked that the Supreme
Court has not incorporated the right to indictment by grand jury in the fourteenth
amendment due process provisions, and that the Court did not retroactively apply the
right to trial by jury or the requirements of the O'Callahan decision. See id.
166. Id.
167. Relford, 401 U.S. at 369 (emphasis added); O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265 (emphasis in original); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (emphasis
in original).
168. Trottier, 9 M.J. at 346 (citing Reinstitution of Procedures for Registration
Under the Military Selective Service Act: Hearings on S.109 & S.226 Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 51-53 (1979) (statements of Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., Chief of Staff, United States
Air Force; Adm. Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. Bernard W.
Rogers, Chief of Staff, United States Army; and Gen. Louis H. Wilson, Commandant,
United States Marine Corps) (criticizing Court of Military Appeals' restriction of
court-martial jurisdiction, making it virtually impossible to punish servicemembers
who commit drug offenses off-base».
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fundamental rights to trial by jury and grand jury indictment, the
Court of Military Appeals violated the spirit, if not the letter, of
O'Callahan and Relford.
In sum, the Trottier decision violated the Supreme Court's mandate for an ad hoc determination of whether a given offense is service connected. Though the Trottier court concluded by actually
applying the Relford criteria to the case before it,169 the court's
expansive rationale indicates that it paid only lip service to the ad
hoc approach. Instead of carefully balancing the serviceconnection criteria set forth in Relford, assuring that military
jurisdiction - and its attendant limitations on individual rights will be limited to "the least possible power, " the court vastly expanded its jurisdiction by laying down a nearly per se rule for
jurisdiction over off-base, drug-related offenses. Indeed, by implicitly concluding that the interests in military discipline and
preparedness automatically outweigh all of the other Relford factors, the Trottier court turned Relford and O'Callahan on their
heads. For servicemembers charged with drug-related offenses,
the important individual rights that an ad hoc, service-connection
inquiry helps protect were thus eliminated from consideration.
Since Trottier, military courts have taken an even more cursory
approach to the service-connection requirement in cases involving
drug-related offenses.17o
When it was handed down, the Trottier decision was widely regarded as heralding the return of the military courts' per se rule
announced in United States v. Beeker. 171 Lower military courts
immediately expanded the scope of Trottier's jurisdiction analysis.172 In United States v. Brace,173 decided only eight months after
Trottier, a serviceman was charged with the use and possession of
marijuana while on a six-day leave, 275 miles from his base.174
The dissenting judge found that the facts of Brace fit squarely
within one of the Trottier court's two exceptions to a per se rule
for jurisdiction over drug-related offenses - the exception for use
of drugs while on extended leave from the base.175 Nonetheless,
the majority, finding no reason to apply any exception to Trottier's
169. See 9 M.J. at 351-52.
170. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
171. See generally Trottier, 9 M.J. at 353 (Fletcher, J., concurring) ("the majority
opinion is a homograft of Beeker"); Schutz, supra note 125, at 20, 26 (statements by the
chief judge of the Court of Military Appeals and recent decisions by lower military
courts indicate that Trottier is coextensive with Beeker).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Lange, 11 M.J. 884 (A.F.C.M.R.1981); United States
v. Brace, 11 M.J. 794 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981); see also infra notes 173-76 and accompanying
text (discussing Brace).
173. 11 M.J. 794 (A.F.C.M.R.1981).
174. fd. at 794.
175. fd. at 795 (Kastl, J., dissenting) (citing Trottier, 9 M.J. at 350 n.28).

general principles, did not even allude to the Relford Court's
criteria for service-connected offenses.176
Recent decisions of the Court of Military Appeals remove any
doubts that the court has returned to an essentially per se rule for
finding service connection in drug-related offenses. In Murray v.
Haldeman,177 the defendant was charged with using marijuana
while on an authorized one-month leave from the service.178 A
compulsory urine test given to the defendant soon after he reported for duty showed that he had at some prior time used marijuana.179 The lower military court ruled . against Murray's
contention that the court-martial lacked jurisdiction,180 and the
Court of Military Appeals affirmed that ruling.18l
The Court of Military Appeals held that "even when a servicemember uses a psychoactive drug in private while he is on extended leave far away from any military installation, that use is
service-connected, if he later enters a military installation while
subject to any physiological or psychological effects of the
drug."182 To support its conclusion, the court emphasized the
gravity of the drug-abuse problem in the armed forces and the
need to curtail drug-related offenses by military personnel.183 The
court then turned to Trottier. Even though the facts paralleled
Trottier's jurisdictional exception for use of drugs on a lengthy
period of leave,184 the court held that the trace of THC present in
Murray's urine was dispositive.185 Most significantly, the court did
not even refer to the Relford criteria; instead, it simply cited the
Trottier court's broad justifications for redefining the serviceconnection test. 186
In effect, the Murray court totally disregarded the ad hoc analysis mandated by the Supreme Court to protect defendants' basic
constitutional rights. In its cursory analysis, the military court
relied solely upon Trottier's questionable reasoning and on the
court's concern for the gravity of drug abuse in the military.187
The Court of Military Appeals thus denied basic constitutional
176. See Brace, 11 M.J. at 795.
177. 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A.1983).
178. Id. at 75-76.
179. Id. at 76.
180. Id. at 75.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 80 (emphasis added). In support, the court cited the Supreme Court's
"[repeated recognition of] the importance of protecting the security and integrity of
military installations." See id. n.6 (citations omitted).
183. See id. at 78-79.
184. See Trottier, 9 M.J. at 350 n.28.
185. See Murray, 16 M.J. at 80.
186. See id. at 79-80; supra notes 128-68 and accompanying text.
187. See Murray, 16 M.J. at 78-79. It is interesting to note that a 1982 survey commissioned by the Department of Defense found that overall drug use in the military
forces had declined significantly since 1980, see R. BRAY, L. GUESS, R. MAsON, R. HUBBARD, D. SMITH, M. MARDSEN & J. RACHEL, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 1982 WORLDWIDE
SURVEY OF ALcOHOL AND NONMEDICAL DRUG USE AMONG MILrrARY PERsONNEL 45
(1983), and that the military's use of marijuana and cocaine was significantly lower
than that of the civilian population; see id. at 54.
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rights to a defendant accused of a drug-related offense without
properly employing the ad hoc analysis necessary to balance the
military's need for discipline against the defendant's interest in a
civilian trial.188 In the cases decided since Trottier and Murray,
military courts have continued to ignore the ad hoc serviceconnection test mandated by the Supreme Court in O'Callahan
and Relford. Rather than perform detailed service-connection
analyses of their own, military courts have simply cited Trottier
and Murray to support ever-expanding assertions of jurisdiction
over drug-related offenses.189
188. Had the court actually performed an ad hoc service-connection analysis, it is
extremely unlikely that it would have found Murray's alleged offenses service connected. Murray was on an authorized one-month leave hundreds of miles from his
military base when he allegedly used marijuana. Murray, 16 M.J. at 75. The only
evidence of his alleged unlawful use was a trace of THC found in his urine when he
submitted to a compulsory urinalysis upon returning to base at the end of his leave.
Id. at 76. Very few, if any, of the 21 factors stressed by the Supreme Court in Relford,
see supra notes 83-84, are implicated by Murray's personal use of marijuana while on
an authorized, extended leave from his military base: Murray was properly absent
from his base; his alleged crime was committed away from the base, in a place not
under military control, and within United States' territorial limits; the alleged crime
was committed during peacetime and was therefore unrelated to Congress's war
power, see supra notes 147-62 and accompanying text; because of the inexactness and
ineffectiveness of urinalysis for determining whether an individual's abilities remain
in any way impaired simply because a trace of THC is found in his urine, see PerezReyes, Di Guiseppi, Davis, Schindler & Cook, Comparison of Effects of Marijuana
Cigarettes of Three Dif.ferent Potencies, 31 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 617, 620 (1982); Whiting & Manders, Confirmation of a Tetrahydrocannabinol
Metabolite in Urine by Gas Chromatography, 6 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 49, 49
(1982), there was no evidence of any connection between Murray's military duties and
his alleged offense; Murray was not engaged in the performance of any duty related to
the military when he committed his alleged offense; civilian courts also prosecute
drug offenses; Murray's alleged use of marijuana while on an authorized, extended
leave did not likely constitute a flouting of military authority; Murray's alleged
offense did not threaten the military post or any military property; and Murray's
alleged offense did not threaten the security of persons on his military base.
189. See, e.g., United States v. Hemenway, 19 M.J. 955, 956 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985) (use
of cocaine during 40-day leave provides unique military interest sufficient to support
jurisdiction); United States v. Brown, 19 M.J. 826, 831 (N.M.C.M.R. 1984) (pursuant to
Murray, a positive urinalysis test for drugs alone confers jurisdiction upon a courtmartial, with no added need for a showing of impairment); United States v. Frost, 19
M.J. 509, 511 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984) (positive urinalysis satisfies the jurisdictional requirement for courts-martial); United States v. White,17 M.J.1119,l120 (N.M.C.M.R.1984)
(admissions by accused as to his use of marijuana would be sufficient to satisfy the
service-connection test because the military has a special interest in punishing illegal
conduct that has the effect of lowering public esteem for the service); United States v.
Stookey, 14 M.J. 975, 976 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982) (the two jurisdictional exceptions in
Trottier do not apply to a servicemember on leave who remains in the local civilian
community adjoining a military base); United States v. Lange, 11 M.J. 884, 885-86
(A.F.C.M.R. 1981) (accused's use of marijuana on leave in a remote location held service connected because he later participated in a drug-rehabilitation program and his
absence had an adverse impact on the mission of his unit); United States v. Brace, 11
M.J. 794, 795 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981) (airman's remote use of marijuana service connected
due to potential and actual adverse impact on military authority, discipline, security,
morale, mission, and readiness).

Conclusion
The Supreme Court designed the service-connection inquiry to
balance the military's need for discipline with the defendant's constitutional rights to a jury trial and a grand jury indictment. Since
the Trottier decision, the military courts have focused exclusively
on the perceived severity of the drug problem in the armed
services and have disregarded both the defendants' rights and the
Supreme Court's test designed to preserve those rights. If military
defendants are to be guaranteed their fundamental constitutional
rights, Trottier and the line of decisions following it must be overruled, and the military courts must return to a diligent application
of the service-connection criteria. "Today, as always, the people,
no less than their courts, must remain vigilant to preserve the
principles of our Bill of Rights, lest in our desire to be secure we
lose our ability to be free."190

190. Warren, The Bill ofRights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 203 (1962).

